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NOTES
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A FEDERAL ANTI-LYNCHING BILL. By
Hon. L. C. Dyer and George C. Dyer.
This article was prepared by George C. Dyer, a Senior in the Wash-
ington University School of Law, with suggestions and criticisms
given him by Hon. L. C. Dyer, Representative in Congress for the
Twelfth Congressional District of Missouri, and author of the pro-
posed Anti-Lynching Bill which the article discusses.
In addition to the regular members of the staff, the following students
in the School of Law have written Case Comments: Max Soffer,
Morris Cohn, J. J. Chused, and Robert Bruce Snow, Jr.
ACTIONS AT LAW BETWEEN PARTNERS IN MISSOURI
AS COMPARED WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Prior to the decision in 1897 of Willis v. Barron,' it was well settled
in Missouri that no action at law could be maintained by one partner
against his firm or associate for money arising out of and connected with
partnership business until there had been a settlement of the partnership
accounts.2 The reason for the rule was twofold, formal and sub-
stantive. The formal barrier to the suit at law grew out of the fact
that the partnership, as such, had no judicial existence as distinguished
from the persons composing it,3 and could sue and be sued only in the
names of its individual partners joined in the proceeding. To be both
plaintiff and defendant involved an inconsistency which the law does
not permit. The result would be, moreover, that the law would give
force to a contract which a man made with himself, and in the event
that he should recover a judgment, he might be called upon as a mem-
ber of the firm to pay it.
The substantive barrier to the action is the truer and more precise
reason.' It results from the principle that a partner's interest in the
partnership's effects is not his aliquot part thereof, but is his proper
share in the balance of the surplus remaining after the payment of the
'143 Mo. 450, 45 S. W. 289, 65 Am. St. Rep. 673.
'Stothert v. Knox, 5 Mo. 112; McKnight v. McCutchen, 27 Mo. 436; Bam-
brick v. Simms, 102 Mo. 158, 14 S. W. 935.
'Willis v. Barron, slupra; Cutting v. Daigneau, 151 Mass. 297, 23 N. E. 839;
Summerson v. Donovan, 110 Va. 657, 66 S. E. 822; Bond v. Bemis, 55 Mo. 524.
'Cutting v. Daigneau, supra; Mulhall v. Cheatham, 1 Mo. App. 476. In Stod-
dard v. Wood, 9 Gray 90, the court stated: "The difficulty is not merely a mat-
ter of parties; it lies much deeper. A promise by a partner to the partnership
is a promise to pay himself with other persons; and it cannot be said that any-
thing is due until the whole is settled, until all the assets are collected, and all
the debts paid. Until then, it cannot be known where there is any balance due;
still less, what that balance is."
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partnership debts and after a settlement of the accounts between the
several partners." Ordinarily, in a going concern it is impossible to
show without a final settlement of all accounts which partner really
owes the firm. It might be that the claimant partner is overdrawn or
that firm losses overshadow and exhaust his potential claim completely.
Thus, a partner's only remedy has always been to go into equity, pray-
ing for an accounting and dissolution. His action at law was barred if
the defendant pleaded an unsettled partnership account.6
But the decision in Willis v. Barron in effect overturned the foregoing
doctrine as applied to a partner suing on a promissory note given him
by the firm as evidence of an advance made to it. In that case the
plaintiff's decedent and the defendant were partners. The firm exe-
cuted its note to Willis as payee, and his executrix sued the defendant
for one-half the amount of the note. The defendant pleaded payment,
a counterclaim of an unadjusted partnership account, and prayed the
appointment of a referee and for an accounting. The court held that
the suit on the note was an action at law which was not changed to one
in equity by the nature of the defense. The court relied on R. S. Mo.
1889, sec. 2384 (R. S. Mo. 1919, sec. 2155), which provides that "all
contracts which by the common law are joint only shall be construed
to be joint and several." The court stated:
The partner holding the firm's note payable absolutely to him-
self at common law was under no disability save only that the note,
being a joint promise, to sue on it he was necessarily compelled to
sue himself; but since the statute now makes the note the several con-
tract of each member of the firm, and makes each partner liable in
solido, the payee is no longer under the necessity of suing himself,and
hence so far as the question of parties to pleadings is concerned he
can sue either or all of the other partners without infringing the
common law rule of pleading. Likewise as the note is the several
contract of each partner no legal objection can be raised to the
validity of the contract itself, as they are clearly adversary parties
capable of contracting each with the other and binding each other.
While the payee of such note could not be both debtor to, and
creditor of himself at common law, it is not sure that the payee can
not be creditor, and the other members of the partnership, who bor-
row his money and give him a partnership note therefore, cannot be
his debtors, each being severally liable thereon for the whole amount
of the note.
Granted that the joint debtors' statute, insofar as it has been extended
to suits against members of partnerships, has the force of removing the
'Ewart v. Mercantile Co., 130 Mo. 112, 31 S. W. 1041; Reyburn v. Mitchell,
106 Mo. 365, 16 S. W. 592; Johnson v. Shirley, 152 Ind. 453, 53 N. E. 459;
Menagh v. Whitwell, 52 N. Y. 146, 11 Am. Rep. 683.
'M Hale v. Oertel, 15 Mo. App. 583; Scott v. Caruth, 50 Mo. 120.
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formal barrier to actions at law between partners, nevertheless the sub-
stantive barrier still stands. 7 And it must not be overlooked that a long
line of legal decisions in both England and America always assigned
this as the true reason for not permitting such suits." On principle, it
cannot be doubted that the result reached in Willis v. Barron may work
severe hardship.' To consider a specific case: Suppose that A and B
are partners in a mercantile business, and A advances a sum of money
to the firm upon its note when it becomes financially embarrassed. Be-
fore A advances the loan, he is overdrawn, but the loan creates the ap-
pearance that the firm is his debtor. In a few days the merchandise in
the store, uninsured, is destroyed by fire. A is insolvent individually,
while B is a moneyed man. The firm is heavily indebted. According
to the principal case if A sued B on the note, A would prevail, despite
the fact that his interest in the firm had been exhausted, and despite
the fact that he should be paying money into the firm rather than draw-
ing from it or from his co-partner who has been rendered liable indi-
vidually on the note. The inequitable and unjust effect which the rule
works on the co-partner B is obvious and needs no amplification. Thus,
the result militates against the well-established proposition laid down in
Reyburn v. MitchellI that a partner's interest includes "nothing more
than the interest of the partner in the surplus remaining after the pay-
ment of the firm debts and an adjustment of the partnership matters,"
since he is permitted to recover far more than any interest which he
possesses in the partnership. Instead, it seems that in allowing the
plaintiff to recover for one-half the amount of the note, the court in
Willis v. Barron departed from established law and, first, reverted to
the cotenancy idea of a partnership" by conceding that each partner
owed one-half of the note-a conception which long has been ex-
ploded,--and, second, permitted a court of law to make an apportion-
ment,---an act which is equitable in its nature.12
An examination of American decisions reveals that a few other juris-
dictions have accomplished the same results as did the Missouri tribunal
in Willis v. Barron. The Indiana court in Duck v. Abbott"s permitted
one partner to sue and recover at law from his co-partner money claimed
to be due on unsettled partnership accounts. But this was due to the
fact that the case was decided in the early days of the operation of the
code before courts began to limit what the code accomplished. The
Indiana court rested its decision upon the fact that the distinctions be-
tween law and equity had been abolished and lost sight of the fact that
the substantive principles of each system were still unaltered.14 This
'Milburn v. Codd, 7 Barn. & Cress. 419; Cansten v. Burke, 2 Harr. & Gill 295.
"Cutting v. Daigneau, supra; Goldsborough v. McWilliams, 2 Cranch, C. C.401; Robson v. Curtis, 1 Starkie 78; Richardson v. Bank of England, 4 MyL &
C. 165, 41 Eng. Reprint 65.
Wiles v. Suydam, 64 N. Y. 177.
21106 Mo. 365. 'Johnson v. Wingfield, 42 S. W. 203, 205.
"Morrison v. Stockwell's Admin., 9 Dana (Ky.) 172.
"24 Ind. 349.
" In Russel v. Minnesota Outfit, 1 Minn. 162, the court pointed out that the
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decision was followed in a later case"5 where the action was based on a
promissory note, but since then the Indiana courts have fallen in line
with the weight of authority on the proposition and have recognized the
foundation of the Duck case to be erroneous.1 6
In Morrison v. Stockwell's Admin., 7 the Kentucky court permitted a
recovery upon a state of facts similar to that of the principal Missouri
decision, but for the entire amount of the note sued upon. The in-
genious reasoning of the court merits reproduction: "An obligation
executed by several to one of themselves is of no validity against him,
as he could not bind himself to himself; but is good against the others,
as their obligation to him. Hence in effect it is merely the note of one
partner to the other; and the payee may sue his partner, or his adminis-
trator upon it and may recover the whole amount-as a court of law
cannot apportion the debt." However, the report of the case does not
indicate that a set-off was pleaded, and the court intimated that if there
was anything wrong in the origin of the note, in consequence of which
the party thus legally bound for the whole should only be liable for a
part, the remedy was in equity. Since the Kentucky courts have
changed their stand on this proposition there is no need of further
concern with it.-8
An Iowa case1 9 which permitted one partner to sue his co-partners
and firm at law before an accounting, involves a peculiar set of facts.
The petitioner applied for a writ of mandamus against a partnership
board of trustees of which he was a member, and the court of law stated
that it would assist the plaintiff, because he had no remedy in equity.
But Iowa, too, does not at the present time permit one person to sue
his co-partner at law either on a note or on open accounts.
20
Of the few states which have extended the joint debtors' act to part-
nerships, Missouri is the only one which extends it to actions between
the partners themselves.2 ' The interpretation of a similar statute in
such a case arose in the United States for the first time in the adjudica-
tion of Bailey & Storm v. Bancker.22  The defendant was a member of
code in abolishing the distinction between law and equity did not change the
character of the relief to which a party is entitled, but only the form and man-
ner of obtaining it, so that the complaint must, as before the passage of the code,
be drawn with a special view to the relief demanded; in consequence of which
no action at law can lie between partners to settle any question relating to their
business. Gillett v. Chavez, 12 N. M. 353, 78 Pac. 68, presents the same
proposition. ' Shalter v. Caldwell, 27 Ind. 376.
'Meredith v. Ewuing, 85 Ind. 410; Adams v. Shewalter, 139 Ind. 178, 38 N.
E. 607. 9 Dana (Ky.) 172.
Coulson v. Ferree, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 457, 85 S. W. 457.
Cooper v. Nelson, 38 Ia. 440.
McReynolds v. McReynolds, 74 Ia. 89, 36 N. W. 903; Erret v. Prichard, 121
Ia. 496, 96 N. W. 963.
'Willis v. Barron, supra; Caldwell v. Dismukes, 111 Mo. App. 570, 86 S. W.
270; Short v. Thomas, 178 Mo. App. 400, 163 S. W. 252. In the Caldwell case
the plaintiff, assignee of a partner who drew a check on the partnership in his
own favor, was permitted to recover from the co-partner.
=3 Hill 188, 38 Am. Dec. 625; Woods v. Ridley, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 194.
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a corporation whose charter provided that "the stockholders shall be
jointly and severally personally liable for the payment of all debts or
demands contracted by said corporation." The courts of New York
had interpreted this and charters of a similar character as placing stock-
holders on the same footing as though they had not been incorporated
and as making them answerable as partners for the debts of the com-
pany.s Suit was brought on a promissory note by a stockholder, and in
denying a right of action the court stated that if the stockholders are
to be regarded as partners, it is then quite clear that one member cannot
maintain an action against the others for a debt due from the whole.
The court then stated expressly that the provision holding the stock-
holders severally as well as jointly does not alter the principle, for it is
"still the case of one partner suing another for a debt due from the
whole firm."' 24 There was a further statement that the "Legislature
did not intend" to provide for protection of creditors who were mem-
bers of the corporation, for they do not come within the reason and
the policy of the law, which was made for the protection of third per-
sons dealing with the company and not for the benefit of the very
members of the company themselves.21 "They are left and should in
justice be left to such remedies as had already been provided by law
for the adjustment of partnership transactions. They may go into
Chancery for an accounting and have the claims of all parties settled on
equitable principles. '"2 6  The court pointed out that to take a contrary
stand and permit the plaintiff to sue his co-partners would effectuate a
preposterous result, because when the defendant had paid the debt, he
would then stand as the creditor of the partnership with nothing to
hinder him from turning around and recovering the same money from
the plaintiff as co-partner, with the possibility that the parties might
continue to sue each other on the same claim to the end of the chapter.
But according to well-settled principles of partnership law, the alarm of
the court was quite unnecessary, since a partner who pays demands
against his firm cannot maintain an action at law against his co-partners
to recover back the whole or any part of the money.27 Nevertheless the
decision as it is could well rest on the proposition that the legislature
intended the statute to afford protection to third persons dealing with the
partnership, and did not purport to give the partners themselves greater
rights than they had had previously.28
Allen v. Sewall, 2 Wendell 327; Moss v. Oakley, 2 Hill 265.
"To arrive at this conclusion the court relied on Milburn v. Codd, supra, and
Cansten v. Burke, supra.
"Accord: Deming v. Pulleston, 33 N. Y. Super. 235; Clark v. Meyers, 11
Hun. 609. "Wiles v. Suydam, supra.
' In Gridley v. Dole, 4 N. Y. 486, it was held that "If a partner pay demands
against the firm, he can not maintain an action at law against his co-partners to
recover back the whole or any part of the money. His action in such a case
being on an implied promise, would require an accounting to be taken in order
to ascertain whether he had paid more than his proportion." Accord: Lawrence
v. Clark, 9 Dana (Ky.) 257, 35 Am. Dec. 133; Bond v. Bemis, 55 Mo. 357.
" In Clark v. Cable, 21 Mo. 223, which held that the joint debtors' statute in
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Section 6229 of the Arkansas Statutes of 1921, Crawford & Moses
Digest, provides that "Joint obligations shall be construed to have the
same effect as joint and several obligations, and may be sued on, and
recoveries had thereon in like manner." By judicial interpretation this
section has been applied to partners.29 But the Arkansas decisions reach
a result contrary to Willis v. Barron, which seems to be better founded
on principle. In Houston v. Brown,30 it was held that an action will
not lie upon an instrument of writing acknowledging the receipt of
money by defendant from plaintiff, specifying its payment on account of
a partnership concern, unless the plaintiff prove that there is not an
existing unsettled partnership account. And it was stated more spe-
cifically in a later case"' that the only action that can be maintained be-
tween partners upon a partnership transaction before a settlement of the
partnership affairs is a suit for an accounting.3 2 Kentucky courts, fol-
lowing a similar statute,a, reversed Morrison v. Stockwell's Admin.,
supra, and went still further in the direction of the Arkansas
courts, holding that where a partner buys a firm note, he cannot sue his
co-partners and obtain a judgment at law,, his only remedy being to
commence an action for the settlement of the partnership wherein the
rights of all parties can be adjudged.3 5 In Minnesota the joint debtors'
act has been interpreted to give rights to creditors against the partners
individually, 6 but the courts have adhered to the proposition that as a
general rule one partner cannot sue another in an action at law on any
form of partnership obligation. And a similar statute has likewise
been held not to affect the rights of partners between themselves in
Mississippi, where a court of law has no jurisdiction of an indebted-
ness arising out of unadjusted partnership dealings.38
In West Virginia the question arose when one of two partners sued
the other on a note to recover one-half the cost of the equipment for
the joint enterprise furnished and installed by the plaintiff, under an
Missouri could not be extended to plaintiffs and that joint obligors who wish
to enforce an agreement must join in their action, the court said: "There is
nothing in the present practice act which affects the law of joint contracts. That
act deals only with the mode of procedure, and does not affect the law of con-
tracts, as it existed prior to its enactment." The same could be said logically
regarding the law of partnership.
"Bradford Rainwater & Co. v. Toney, 30 Ark. 763.
N 33 Ark 333. ' King v. Moore, 72 Ark. 469.
' Missouri courts held the same in Stothert v. Knox, 5 Mo. 112; Springer v.
Cabell, 10 Mo. 640; McKnight v. McCutchen, supra; Smith v. Smith, 33 Mo.
577; Scott v. Caruth, 50 Mo. 120.
'The Kentucky Joint Debtors' statute was held applicable to partnerships in
Williams v. Rogers, 14 Bush (Ky.) 776.
' Deavenport v. Green River Deposit Bank, 138 Ky. 352, 128 S. W. 88.
' Sebastian v. Booneville Acad. Co., 22 Ky. Law Rep. 186; Coulson v. Ferree,
srupra.
' Fryklund v. Great Northern Railway Co., 101 Minn. 37, 111 N. W. 727.
' Reis v. Reis, 99 Minn. 446, 109 N. W. 997; Masterman v. Lumberman's
National Bank, 61 Minn. 299; 63 N. W. 723.
" Evans v. White, 31 So. 833; Ivy v. Walker, 58 Miss. 253.
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agreement that the defendant should reimburse him to the extent of
one-half, but the court stated that the plaintiff could not sue until an
accounting, and the joint debtors' statute was not deemed to be ap-
plicable.3'
Nevertheless, despite the holding in Willis v. Barron and its far reach-
ing effect, Missouri courts have not held as yet that there can be a suit
at law between partners on a general account or on parallel matters,40
but have limited it merely to suits on notes. They recognize that litiga-
tion is apt to breed hard feelings, foment discord, and lead to dissolu-
tion."1 Hence they do not enter into a consideration of mere partner-
ship squabbles; and whenever these are the subject of the suit the gen-
eral common law rule barring the action applies. However, even at
common law, one was allowed to sue his co-partner in certain situations
despite the absence of an acc6unting and winding up of partnership af-
fairs. 12  And insofar as those exceptions to the general rule constitute
the weight of authority, Missouri adheres to them. It might be pointed
out in advance that the nature of these exceptions reveals that the com-
mon law, with all of its tenacity for hanging on to form, considered the
substantive barrier as the true bar to such a suit. Sometimes, for ex-
ample, a controversy between partners will appear on first view to have
arisen out of a transaction connected with the firm's business, when
really it stands on an independent footing and may be the subject of a
legal action between the partners. Bierman v. Braches"3 illustrates
this. And Byrd v. Fox" is authority for the generally accepted proposi-
tion that an action at law may be maintained by a party to an executory
agreement to form a partnership, to recover damages for the breach.
This rule likewise is well-founded, for the plaintiff's rights come not
from the business itself, but from the defendant's breach of agreement
to enter the business contemplated. Obviously there would be no
partnership affairs requiring a settlement.
If only one matter or item is in dispute between the partners, an
action at law may be maintained on that item, though there has been no
settlement of the firm's affairs. 45 And if the partnership is formed for
the purpose of carrying out a single transaction or venture, there being
no involved or complicated accounts, one partner may sue his co-partner
for his share of the profits or losses of the venture.' 6 It also has been
held that a suit at law is the proper remedy for breaches of personal
covenants, as where one partner expressly indemnifies the plaintiff for
"Jones v. Rose, 94 S. E. 41; Summerson v. Donovan, 110 Va. 657, 66 S. E.
822, accord.
' Broclman v. Fehrenbach (Mo. App.), 238 S. W. 1087; Boyce v. Howell (Mo.
App.), 210 S. W. 89. "Lord v. Hull, 178 N. Y. 9, 70 N. E. 69.
Preston v. Strutton, 1 Anstr. 50, 145 Eng. Reprint 797; Radenhurst v. Bates,
3 Bing. 463, 130 Eng. Reprint 591.
"14 Mo. 24; also Seaman v. Johnson, 46 Mo. 117; Russell v. Grimes, 46 Mo.
410; Stone v. Wendover, 2 Mo. App. 247. "8 Mo. 574.
,Boyce v. Howell, supra; Byrd v. Fox, supra; Whetstone v. Shaw, 70 Mo.
575; Johnson v. Ewald, 82 Mo. App. 276.
McNealIy v. Bartlett, 123 Mo. App. 58, 99 S. W. 767.
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any losses that should occur in the business during a stipulated period.'7
When the plaintiff's right of recovery arises out of a contract of settle-
ment between the partners, by which the defendant is to pay for his
partner's interest in the partnership properties, the suit is not in equity
but at law.' 8 And where the plaintiff's right to the amount sued for
did not grow out of a partnership arrangement between him and the de-
fendants, but out of a contract by which they were to pay him that sum
as the purchase price for a sale to them of a part interest in the proper-
ties, the suit is not one in equity.Y9
One partner may sue another at law for fraud in inducing the part-
nership. In the case of Gilliam v. Loeb,'50 one of several partners in-
duced the others to contribute a share of money for the purpose of buy-
ing property, misrepresenting to them the purchase price so that they
paid more than the property cost, and he pocketed the excess. The court
held that each of the partners so defrauded could bring a separate suit
to recover the excess of his contribution to the purchase price, without
any joinder of parties. It was pointed out that where fraud entered
into a proposition the latter is thrust onto an independent footing and
segregated from all partnership affairs at the option of those defrauded.
Furthermore, as Judge Goode intimated, the whole firm was not de-
frauded, but only the individual partners.
All in all, the cases examined, directly or by way of inference, point
to the conclusion that until an accounting is had and a balance struck,
the relation of debtor and creditor does not exist between partners so
as to permit an action at law between them, (1) unless by their mutual
agreement the partners have dealt with each other in such a way that
the subject of their agreement is so segregated from partnership affairs
that each man deals solely as an individual, or (2) unless there never
has been an occasion for accounts to arise, or (3) unless one partner by
acts which are wrongful to his co-partners in their individual capacities
affects a segregation of any item. Insofar as Willis v. Aarron is appo-
site this conclusion, it is hoped that the Missouri courts, which have cited
it almost religiously on every question affecting the relations between
partners, will reverse themselves and declare the intention of the legis-
lature in passing the joint debtors' statute to give new rights to third
persons, but not to joint obligors themselves.
ABRAHAm E. MARGOLIN, '29.
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY OF HOLDERS OF SHARES IN
BUSINESS TRUSTS
Men are ever seeking means of doing business which involve the least
possible financial risk to themselves. The trust, which is of ancient
lineage, is now enjoying the favor of many business men, under the
"Whiteheill v. Shickle, 43 Mo. 537; Stone v. Windover, 2 Mo. App. 247.
*' Bigham v. Tinsley, 149 Mo. App. 467.
Crocker v. Barteau, 212 Mo. 350.
"131 Mo. App. 70; also Nicholas v. Haddock, 180 S. W. 31.
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